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STANDARD OF CARE FOR STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES: THE INTERSECTION OF LIABILITY
UNDER THE IDEA AND TORT THEORIES

Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D. *

INTRODUCTION

The responsibility of public schools to provide related
services and appropriate placements for students with
disabilities intersects with schools' obligation to protect
students from harm. 1 Students with disabilities receiving
special education services under the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) 2 differ from the remainder
of the public school population because the manner in which
school officials interact with them is determined to a large
extent by services and placement decisions reflected in a
student's Individualized Education Program (IEP). 3 Because
the IEP can provide considerable details regarding a disabled
student's needs and behaviors, the question becomes how that
knowledge should affect a school's standard of care for those
students. Indeed, do schools have a heightened standard of care
to assure the safety of fragile students as well as protecting
students in general from those with behavior disorders? The
answers are not simple. The interface between the IDEA and
tort liability standard of care has never been clear and courts
have been somewhat cautious about using the language of an

*Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D. is Professor and the Roslyn Z. Wolf Endowed Chair in
Urban Educational Leadership at Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio.
1. This article represents an update of two earlier articles by the same author:
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Supervisory Standard of Care for Students With Disabilities, 80
ED. LAW REP. 779 (1993); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Standard of Care and Students with
Disabilities, 148 ED. LAW REP. 553 (2001). This article appears in 252 Education Law
Reporter 527 (2010).
2. 20 U.S. C. § 1400 et seq.
3. For statutory obligations regarding the IEP, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414, 1415(d),
(f).
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IEP as the basis for a standard of care, if for no other reason
than that a heightened standard of care being set for disabled
students may not be the same for the majority of students who
have no IEPs. Thus, in a large sense, does the heightened
investment in resources and personnel attention required for
students with disabilities under the IDEA also translate into a
heightened standard of care if those students with disabilities
are injured or cause injury to others?
This article explores issues of legal liability for school
personnel where students with disabilities are injured in school
settings or cause injuries to employees and other students in
schools. While questions related to legal liability are varied,
they tend to fall within two broad areas: standard of care
relating to injuries to or by students; and, standard of care for
employees working with students with or training others to
work with students with disabilities. In both areas, the legal
issue revolves around the concept of heightened standard of
care, especially where framed by the language of students'
IEPs. To what extent should injuries to, or caused by, students
with disabilities be considered within the context of a
heightened standard of care where an IEP reveals a student's
propensity to cause injuries or to be vulnerable to injuries?
Where services provided to students with severe disabilities as
part of their IEPs have life-saving components to them (such as
suctioning tracheotomy tubes 4 or ambubag venting5), should
the responsibility for providing those services or for training or
supervising others to provide the services be assessed by a
heightened standard of care? 6

4. Clearing a tracheotomy tube is a routine procedure that occurs after an
operation where a tube has been inserted in the throat to permit breathing.
Indications that the tube needs to be suctioned in order to clean out mucous can
include rattling mucus not cleared with coughing, fast rattling, bubbles of mucus at
tracheotomy opening, fast, noisy, hard breathing, and dry, whistling sound.
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI ACADEMIC HEALTH
OTOLARYNGOLOGY,
TRACHEOTOMY

CENTER,
CARE

DEPARTMENT OF
HANDBOOK,

www.med.uc.edu/ent/documents/Tracheotomy Handbook. pdf (last visited 617/09).
5. An ambu bag "is a compressible, self-inflating, non-rebreathing silicon bag,
which has an inlet through which air and additional 0 2 is supplied and an outlet
through this can
be
transferred
to
the
patient."
Pediatric
Oneall,
www.pediatriconcall.com/fordoctor/medical_equipment/ambu_bag.asp
(last
visited
6/16/09).
6. See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that school
nurse's administration of clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) was not a medical
service under IDEA, without reaching the question whether providing CIC constituted
the practice of nursing, thus raising civil and criminal issues about the unauthorized
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To facilitate an understanding of the issues relevant to
students with disabilities and tort liability, this article will be
divided into four parts: Part I discusses the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v.
Garret F. 7 and how satisfying the IDEA's Least Restrictive
Environment (LRE) 8 requirement has been instrumental in
shaping concern among educators about their own tort liability
when students, especially students with disabilities, are
injured; Part II presents case law that has framed tort liability
standards under state common law and constitutional tort
theories involving students with disabilities; Part III analyzes
cases that have applied standards of care to specific
educational settings involving injuries both to students with
disabilities and injuries caused by such students; and, Part IV
summarizes the status of the law and furnishes some
guidelines for educational policy in protecting students with
disabilities within the context of the requirements of the IDEA.

I. GARRET F., THE IDEA AND THE LIMITATION ON THE
EXCLUSION OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES FROM REGULAR
EDUCATION

A. Garret F.: The Responsibility to Educate and the Medical
Services Exemption
The IDEA assures that "[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with
children who are not disabled." 9 The effect of this LRE
requirement is that most students with disabilities will be
included in regular classrooms and will be excluded only when

practice of nursing). See Tatro v. State of Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 828 (5th Cir. 1983).
7. 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (holding that continuous nursing services for quadriplegic
student was a related service and not a medical service and student could not be
excluded from regular classroom attendance solely because of the cost associated with
providing that service).
8. 20 U.S.C. § (a)(5)(A) defines LRE as follows:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children
in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children
who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only
when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006).
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those school personnel responsible for designing a disabled
student's IEP can furnish persuasive evidence that "the nature
or severity of [a student's] disability is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 10
The IDEA requires that students eligible for special
education receive related services that will allow them to
receive "some educational benefit" 11 in the least restrictive
environment. 12 The only exception is that school districts are
not required to provide "medical services." 13 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Garret F. 14 held that school personnel were
required to provide a one-on-one nurse as a related service to a
medically fragile student and that such a service did not fall
within the IDEA's medical service exemption. 15 As a result of
Garret F., students with even severe disabilities cannot be
excluded from public schools and regular classrooms within
those schools solely based on the nature and expense of related
services. Garret F. has prompted an awareness by school
personnel of an increased level of responsibility for the safety of
these fragile students. 16 In addition, the inclusion of students

10. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 (a)(2)(ii). 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a)(l) and (2) provide that
"[t]he placement decision-- (1) Is made by a group of persons, including the parents,
and other persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data,
and the placement options; and (2) Is made in conformity with the LRE provisions."
11. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 200 (1982).
12. 20 U.S. C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). However, related services include medical
services that are for "diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." ld.
14. 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (holding that continuous nursing services for quadriplegic
student was a related service and not a medical service and student could not be
excluded from regular classroom attendance solely because of the cost associated with
providing that service).
15. Garret F. resolved a conflict between federal circuits as to whether providing
nonintermittent, full-time nursing services was a "medical service" under IDEA. See 20
U.S. C. § 1401(26)(A) (limiting "medical services" to "diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only"). Compare Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992)
(nonintermittent nursing services to suction tracheotomy tube and feed student
through nasograstic tube was a medical service, in part because the $30,000 cost for a
nurse for one student was excessive, given the limited nursing services available to
nondisabled students) with Dep't of Educ. of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517
(D. Haw. 1982) , aff'd, 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing a person to suction a
tracheotomy tube not a medical service under IDEA, in part because lay persons could
be trained to provide the service).
16. See e.g., Rossetti v. Bd. of Educ. of Schalmont Cent. High Sch., 716 N.Y.S.2d
460 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (A post-Garret F. case raising liability of teacher's aide in
diapering seven years old spastic quadriplegic student who was unable to walk or
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with emotional disabilities in regular education programs has
made school officials potentially responsible for harm to other
persons both within 17 and outside school settings. 18
I. The IDEA's Commitment to Providing Special Education

Services to Students in the Least Restrictive Environment
(LRE): Requirements and Limitations
Because the IDEA assures that "[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with
children who are not disabled," 19 school districts bear the
burden of not only including even severely disabled students in
the regular classroom, but of assuring that such can be
accomplished without unreasonable risk to those students or to
other nondisabled students in the schools. However, in order
for students to be eligible for services under the IDEA they
must meet age standards,2° have a condition listed in the
statute, 21 and by reason of the condition, need "special
education and related services."22 To a large extent, school
officials' concern about tort liability resulting from injuries to
special education students, as opposed to those students
without disabilities, reflects the responsibilities imposed on
school districts under the IDEA. One fundamental difference is
that a school's responsibilities for students with disabilities are
speak and who spent the majority of his waking hours confined to a wheelchair).
17. See J.N. ex rei. Hager v. Bellingham Sch. Dist. No. 501, 871 P.2d 1106 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1994) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment to school district as
to sexual assaults by fourth grade student diagnosed as severely behaviorally disabled
against first grade student during school recess).
18. See Thomas v. City Lights, Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 707 (D.D.C. 2000) (in refusing
to dismiss complaint against an alternative school for assault on plaintiff by five of its
students while on a field trip to a zoo, a federal district court indicated that defendant
could be liable under a Restatement of Torts standard whereby "[o]ne who takes charge
of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third
person to prevent him from doing such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOHTS § 319
(1965)).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)(2006).
20. The age range is three through twenty-one, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(B),
although children within the age range are no longer covered once they have received a
regular high school diploma. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) "mental retardation, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness),
serious emotional disturbance (referred to as "emotional disturbance"), orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities."
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii)(2006).
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set forth in an IEP, a contractual document with a designation
of a disability or disabilities, long-term and short-term goals,
and specified services that is negotiated, and reviewed at least
annually, by parents and school personnel. 23 The identification
of both a disability and the services necessary to permit a
student to receive educational benefit makes a student with an
IEP unique in the sense that those working with that student
are aware of risks that the disabled student may pose to other
students or of risks that may be faced by the disabled student
where his or her services are inadequately or incorrectly
provided. A second difference is that a student with an IEP
that specifies special education nursing services may be
receiving a related service24 not readily available on a regular
basis to students without disabilities. 25 For example, even if
full-time nurses are not be available on a regular basis to
provide IEP nursing services as required in a student's IEP, for
reasons such as cost or a shortage of nurses in the area, those
services, nonetheless, will still have to be provided even if by
school nurse-trained non-nursing personnel. 26 As a result, the
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 sets forth the timeline for preparing an IEP, the content
areas within the IEP, the constituency of the IEP team that drafts the IEP, and the
process for review and change of the IEP. See generally, MARK WEBER, RALPH
MAWDSLEY, & SARAH REDFIELD, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND MATERIALS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 209·241 (LEXIS NEXIS 2007) for a comprehensive discussion of the IDEA's
requirements concerning development and implementation of the IEP.
24. "Related services" are given an expansive definition in IDEA federal
regulations:
Related services means transportation and such developmental, corrective, and
other supportive services as are required to assist a child with a disability to
benefit from special education, and includes speech·language pathology and
audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, early
identification and assessment of disabilities in children, counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical
services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. Related services also include school
health services and school nurse services, social work services in schools, and
parent counseling and training.
34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a).
25. See Vida Svarcas, The Role and Utilization of Nurses in Ohio's Schools
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cleveland State University,) (indicating in Ohio the
high student· nurse ratio, the lack of nurse presence in most public schools on a regular,
daily basis, and the pattern of public school assignment of nurses to functions other
than nursing). See also, Garret F), 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (holding that the exclusion of
"medical services" as a related service under the IDEA did not apply to nursing
services); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5) (medical services "means services provided by a
licensed physician to determine a child's medically related disability that results in the
child's need for special education and related services").
26. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 77 ("[20 U.S.C.] § 1401(a)(17) does not employ cost
in its definition of 'related services' or excluded 'medical services,'[ and] accepting the
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question for school districts is the extent to which the provision
of intensive and potentially lifesaving related services (such as
nursing services), whether by nurses or nurse-trained public
school non-nursing employees, serves to heighten their duty of
care to the students with disabilities receiving those services. A
third difference is that parents under the IDEA have a
mandated, integral role in the process of formulating an IEP
that permits them to challenge the school's program or
placement for that IEP 27 by demanding an adversarial "due
process hearing" 28 and they or the school district may appeal
an adverse decision of the hearing officer to court, which may
hear additional evidence in order to decide the case. 29 The
extent to which parents should share in responsibility for their
children's safety if they fail to furnish information that would
be important in determining the level of services in a student's
IEP has little judicial record but, arguably, parents who have
provided incorrect information, or who have refused to consent
to services that the school considers important for the student's
health or safety should share some measure of responsibility. 30
While "the IDEA imposes an obligation on the School District
to identify and evaluate children with disabilities," 31 parents
may not be able to impose additional financial cost on a school
district where they have failed to request IEP changes at an
IEP meeting. 32

[School] District's cost-based standard as the sole test for determining the scope of the
provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance from
Congress").
27. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (2006).
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (setting forth a broad range of parents' procedural
rights to challenge decisions regarding evaluation, related services, and placement, as
well as entitlements to impartiality, participation in the hearing and a variety of
remedies). 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1415(f)-(i) provides that states may create a hearing review
procedure that must be exhausted before the matter goes to court(§ 1415(g)) but while
the due process hearing progresses the child will remain in the existing placement
during the pendency of proceedings. § 1415(j).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006).
30. See Clay City Consolidated Sch. Corp. v. Timberman, 896 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008) (while not a special education case, a state appeals court held that a
jury was entitled to be instructed as to a contributory negligence defense against
parents suing a coach and a school district for negligence and wrongful death in the
death of their son during a basketball practice where the parents had failed to provide
medical information about the nature of their son's medical condition).
31. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
32. See Schoenbach v. District of Columbia, 309 F.Supp.2d 71, 87 (D.D.C. 2004)
(in rejecting parents' request for reimbursement for unilateral placement of their child
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TORT LIABILITY CASE LAW AND STANDARD OF CARE UNDER
STATE COMMON LAW AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

A. Legal Theories for Recovery of Damages: Requirements and
Limitations
School districts owe to their students a standard of care, at
the mm1mum, determined under ordinary common law
negligence, but in many states, state legislatures have lowered
that standard under their governmental immunity statutes so
that school personnel can be liable only where there is gross
negligence or reckless or willful conduct. 33 However, whatever
the standard of care, the legal analysis as to the burden of
proof begins in the same place by examining whether a
recognized duty was owed, whether a breach of that duty has
occurred, whether the breach was the proximate cause of an
injury, and whether that injury is one cognizable in the state.
School districts have a duty to employ competent and proficient
personnel, to adequately instruct and supervise students and
employees, to provide safe facilities and equipment, and to
make and enforce adequate rules. However, a determination as
to whether a school district owes a duty to a student and
whether that duty has been breached requires viewing the
injury to a person through the filters of foreseeability and the
reasonable person. The reasonable person takes on an injured
student's age, education, and experience, as well as the
student's familiarity with an activity and the difficulty or
dangerousness of the activity. The task for the trier of fact is to
determine whether the injury to the student with those
characteristics was foreseeable. 34 As students mature

in a private school, a federal district court criticized, in colorful language, the parents
for their failure to make their requests known: "Critical to the finding that Anna's
parents' actions contributed to the inappropriateness of the Initial IEP is the dog that
did not bark at the March 26, 2002 IEP meeting").
33. For a statutory definition of "willful and wanton misconduct," see 745 ILCS
10/l-210 where willful and wanton misconduct is defined as "a course of action which
shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their
property." For a comprehensive discussion of the differences between ordinary and
gross negligence/willful conduct, see Charles Russo and Ralph Mawdsley, EDUCATION
LAW§ 6.04[1], Immunity (New York: Law Journal Press 2009) discussing the impact of
state governmental immunity on standard of care.
34. See e.g., Hammond v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll County, 639 A.2d 22:3 [90 Ed.
Law Rep. [256] (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that school district had no duty to warn

1
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physically and mentally and demonstrate improved skills and
competency in dealing with situations posing greater risks of
injury, these filters of reasonable person and foreseeability can
be used by courts to adjust the standard of care owed by school
districts to students. 35 For some students receiving special
education services, though, the rate of change will not be the
same as for typical students and, thus, the question becomes
the extent to which a student's disability, diminished rate of
change in skills, and diminished competencies will affect a
school district's standard of care in providing adequate and
appropriate personnel, rules, supervision, instruction, and safe
premises and equipment. 36
While students with disabilities have a variety of legal
remedies to correct inadequate or inappropriate treatment,
including the nondiscrimination statutes section 50437 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA], 38 this article focuses

female student competing on football team and who suffered serious and permanent
internal injuries of possible serious injury where participation was voluntary; while
notice to parents that such injuries could result from playing football might be a good
practice, the district had no duty to do so).
35. The classic case is Cox v. Barnes, 469 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1971) (finding a school
district not liable for drowning death of a high school senior on a field trip where the
student had attempted to swim to a diving tank 40 yards from shore with a clearly
marked sign, "Off Limits," and where the court determined in part that a eighteenyear-old was old enough to read and obey signs). See also Rixmann v. Somerset Pub.
Sch., 266 N.W.2d :326, 333 (Wis. 1978) (holding that two students characterized by the
court as "not the brightest" could not maintain their lawsuit against the school district
for injuries incurred during a chemistry lab fire where their conduct did not "conform
to that which would be expected of a similarly situated child of the same age and with
the same capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience in creating the initial fire");
Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding no negligence where student injured during practice of routine cheerleading
gymnastic routine had been adequately instructed and the coach had not increased the
level of difficulty from the routines that plaintiff had received instruction for and the
routines being practiced).
36. See Hammond, supra note 33, at 226 (suggesting, without reaching a
conclusion, that a duty to warn and supervise would have been different had plaintiff
been "mentally deficient").
:n. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Sec. 794, better known as § 504, is a vehicle for private
damages claims and provides that:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132. The ADA overlaps § 504 but also extends
nondiscrimination on the basis of disability to private sector organizations with slightly
different variation on the nature of the protected class:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

368

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2010

primarily on state law tort claims framed in negligence, gross
negligence, or willful and wanton conduct. Constitutional tort
claims under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 39 remain a
popular legal theory and are discussed briefly in order to
highlight the differences in standard of proof between the state
law negligence/gross negligence/willful conduct theories and
constitutional theories.

B. Tort Claims under a State Common Law Standard of Care
Whether state claims are viable will depend in the first
analysis on state governmental immunity statutes. Generally,
these statutes exclude governmental entities, including school
districts, from liability. However, these statutes permit liability
if the conduct of governmental entities falls within certain
categories specified within the statutes. These categories vary
among states, but governmental entities may be liable for
employee conduct where the conduct was willful and wanton40
or where the conduct is considered to be ministerial (as opposed
to discretionary) in nature. 41 In many states, though, even if a

or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination hy any such entity.
For a discussion of the difference in the interpretation of §§ 504 and ADA, see Baird v.
Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Title VII employment standard
permitting causation to be proved where disability discrimination was a motivating
factor in discriminatory conduct applied to ADA but not to § 504 which permitted a
claim only when discriminatory conduct was the sole basis for such discrimination).
Both § 504 and ADA are viable only to the extent that the facts involve discrimination.
See Allen v. Susquehanna Township Sch. Dist., 233 Fed. Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2007)
(upholding dismissal of parents' § 504 and ADA claims that the death of a student with
an emotional disability who ran away from school and was killed in traffic allegedly
resulted from the failure of school to appoint an escort failed to state a discrimination
claim where no one had requested or prescribed an escort for him in his IEP).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sec. 1983 creates no rights of its own, but is solely a vehicle
to recover damages for violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom. or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
40. See Summers v. Slivinski, 749 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (remanding
for trial as to whether cheerleader advisor's statements to an injured cheerleader
concerning her performance of a specific routine constituted willful and wanton conduct
that would fall within an exemption from the state's governmental immunity statute).
41. See Babb v. Hamilton County Bd. Of Educ., No. E2004-00782-COA-R3-CV,
2004 WL 2094538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a school principal had exercised
a discretionary function in readmitting a student with a disability who had struck a
teacher and was suspended, and then had struck the teacher again after being
readmitted, where the principal had to balance the risk of further injury to those in the
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government employer is liable, the amount of damages
recoverable from the employer can be limited by statute to a
certain maximum amount. 42 Injured claimants must fit within
one of these statutory exceptions to governmental immunity in
order to recover damages.
In Stiff u. Eastern Illinois Area of Special Education, 43
parents of an epileptic student injured while on a field trip
sued the special education organization and the teachers under
both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct counts for
lack of adequate supervision. When seven years old, the
student plaintiff along with seven other students with
disabilities were taken on a hike in a state park accompanied
by five professionals. 44 While attempting to cross a bridge by
first passing under a tree limb that had fallen over the bridge,
the student's leg buckled causing her to lose her balance and
fall off the bridge, fracturing her femur. The state court of
appeals upheld dismissal with prejudice of the student's
negligence claim under the state's governmental immunity
statute that permitted immunity where public school teachers
had acted in loco parentis toward students. In this case, the
court reasoned that the student's teachers, by conferring and
discussing several possibilities of getting the student across the
bridge before deciding that she would be able to maneuver
under the fallen tree with a teacher a short distance in front of
her, demonstrated the same kind of discretion and decisionmaking process that would be used by parents. The student
also had sought liability within the state's governmental
immunity statute by attempting to prove willful and wanton
conduct by the teachers but the appeals court affirmed the trial

school against the student's stay put and manifestation hearing rights under the
IDEA).
42. See Larson v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979)
(regarding payment of paraplegic student's judgment in excess of $1,000,000 against
school district, PE teacher and school principal, school district responsible for only
$50,000 under governmental immunity statute setting school district minimum
liability at $50,000 where, in this case, the school district had provided only for that
minimum amount of liability insurance coverage). See also Tindley v. Salt Lake City
Sch. Dist., 116 P.3d 295 [200 Ed. Law Rep. [406] (Utah 2005) (upholding statutory
$500,000 limit for damages related to one occurrence as reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical concern).
43. 666 N.E.2d :i4:~ [110 Ed. Law Rep. [1167] (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
44. These professionals were the plaintiffs classroom teacher. adaptive physical
education teacher, crisis interventionist, two teacher's assistants, and a student
teacher. !d. at 344.
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court's directed verdict for the teachers because they had
displayed neither "an utter indifference toward or conscious
disregard for [the student's] safety,"45 the kind of conduct that
would be required if the student were to establish willful and
wanton conduct.
Worth noting in Stiff is that while the teachers prevailed in
the negligence claim, they did so only because they were able to
persuade the court that their conduct with respect to the
student with disabilities represented the same level of care
that the parents of that child would have displayed. Thus, the
discussion that occurred among the teachers prior to
attempting the crossing of the bridge as to the nature of the
child's disability and her risk of injury was crucial to a finding
of statutory immunity. Perhaps, if the teachers had attempted
to cross the bridge without this discussion the court might have
found that the teachers were not excluded from a negligence
claim under the in loco parentis provision in the state's
governmental immunity statute.
More recently, another Illinois appeals court, in Mitchell v.
Special Joint Agreement School District No. 208, 46 determined
that parents of an injured student with disabilities had failed
to produce evidence of willful and wanton conduct in their
damages claim against a school district. In Mitchell, a Down's
Syndrome student who was profoundly mentally delayed, not
able to speak, severely hearing impaired and requiring
assistance with all of his daily functions, including meals, had
close one-on-one supervision so as to prevent his eating too
quickly and putting too much food in his mouth. The social age
of the student in this case was 12 months, his academic age 11
months and his physical size 34 months. The school and staff
were familiar with the plaintiff's specific needs related to food
where he would stuff food too rapidly into his mouth requiring
the intervention of his one-on-one aide to stop him from eating
more food until he had chewed and swallowed the food in his
mouth. While the student had never choked on food in the past
prior to the incident in this case, the student had on several
past occasions grabbed food from nearby trays or from other
students and stuffed the food into his mouth, often swallowing
it without chewing first. On the day during which the student's

45. Stiff, 666 N.E.2d at 346.
46. 887 N.K2d 352 [238 Ed. Law Rep. [8:36] (Ill. i\pp. Ct. 2008).
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injury occurred, the aide had served a cupcake to each student
in the room, carefully cutting up the plaintiffs into small bites
and, after distributing a cupcake to other students, one
cupcake was left on a tray on the table. Mter eating his
cupcake, the student was served cereal and, believing that the
other students had finished their cupcakes and that the risk of
the student's taking food from other students had passed, the
classroom teacher sat at his desk completing an attendance
form, leaving the supervision of the student to the aide. When
the student spilled milk from his cereal on the table, the aide
backed up several feet to grab a paper towel from a sink in the
room to clean up the milk, but kept eye contact with the
student at all times. However, while the aide was wetting a
paper towel at the sink, the student grabbed the remaining
cupcake, stuffed it into his mouth and disregarded the aide's
order to stop. The student began to gag and choke and, despite
the aide's response within seconds and administration of the
Heimlich maneuver, the student had to be transported to a
hospital where he remained in an induced coma for an
indeterminate amount of time. After he awakened, he had
some difficulty walking and incurred $80,000 in medical
expenses that were paid by public aid. The student's willful and
wanton damages claim was premised on the theory that
because the school was aware of his issues with food, taking
even a few steps away from him at lunch demonstrated "a
conscious disregard for his safety."47 Relying on Stiff, the
Mitchell appeals court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to defendants, observing that the "school staff [had]
maintained close supervision over [the student], evincing
concern for his safety."48
However, worth noting is how the Mitchell court parsed the
facts to find the absence of willful and wanton conduct. The
court found three facts controlling:
Both the student's teacher and aide believed that the other
students had finished their cupcakes and that the student
would not be motivated to take food from others when he had
his own cereal to finish;
Although the classroom teacher was seated at his desk, he
had done so believing that the risk of the student's compulsive

47. Id. at 356.
4H. Id. at :i57.
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behavior had passed once the plaintiff and other students had
eaten their cupcakes and student was eating his cereal; and,
Being aware of the student's issues, the aide continued to
maintain eye contact with student as she stepped back a few
feet to the sink without turning her back on him. 49
The fact that does not come into play in this appeals court's
analysis is how leaving the cupcake on the tray within easy
reach of the student might have influenced the result in a
different set of facts. To what extent would plaintiff's claim for
willful conduct have withstood the school district's motion for
summary judgment if the sink had been located farther across
the room from the plaintiff or the aide had turned her back on
the plaintiff when she walked to the sink?
On its face, Mitchell does not seem to have altered the test
for determining willful misconduct, in the sense that the
responsibility for school personnel to provide supervision of
students is commensurate with their knowledge of student
behavior. However, the nature of the supervision for a student
with disabilities, such as the one in Mitchell, would seem to
differ qualitatively from whatever supervision would be
expected for a student without disabilities. The recording of the
Mitchell student's behaviors in his IEP manifested a risk that
was continuous, persistent and life threatening and, thus,
mandated a duty to supervise commensurate with that risk.
Notably missing in Mitchell was a written behavior
intervention plan (BIP) 50 as part of his IEP, but for tort
liability purposes that deficiency appears to have been
compensated for by all of the school personnel's "aware[ness] of
[plaintiff's] specific needs related to food" 51 and their "common
sense" approach to monitoring the plaintiff during meals. 52
Thus, Mitchell reveals an anomaly that, while failure to comply
with a requirement of the IDEA (designing a BIP) can
constitute a violation of a free appropriate public education

49. Id.
50. A BIP is "a written document that outlines how the IEP team and others will
try to intervene with environment and/or the student to alter problematic behaviors
presented by a student and identified in the functional behavioral assessment." Mark
Weber, Ralph Mawdsley and Sarah Redfield, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES ANU
MATERIALS G-3 (Newark NJ: LEXIS NEXIS 2007). See 20 U.S.C. § 14 Hi(k)(l)(D),(F): 34
C.F.R. § 300.503(£).
51. Mitchell, 897 N.E.2d at 354
52. Id. at 355.
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(FAPE) under the IDEA, 53 it will not result in tort liability as
long as the elements of standard of care have been addressed in
some other manner.

C. Section 1983 Constitutional Tort Theory
An injured student also can pursue damages under a
constitutional tort theory, essentially a claim that the injury
resulted from school conduct depriving a student of a
Fourteenth Amendment 54 right to life or liberty without due
process of law. Constitutional tort liability is premised not on
whether a school district has breached a common law duty of
care, but whether a student injury was caused by a violation of
a constitutional right under one or more of three theories whether a school board had a special relationship with the
injured student at the time of injury, 55 whether the injury was
state-created, 56 or whether the board had a policy, custom, or
practice of violating the rights of the student. 57 However,
constitutional tort bears a kinship to common law tort liability
in that courts must determine under either legal claim whether
a breach of legal expectation (common law or constitutional)
caused an injury. 58
In Sargi v. Kent City Board of Education, 59 a special

5.'3. See Nt-osho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003) (failure of
IEP to have BIP attached had denied student FAPE where, even though the student
was making progress in meeting goals, his lack of a BIP with strategies and techniques
to address his behavioral problems kept him out of the regular classroom).
54. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No] State [can] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw").
55. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198
(1989) (finding that student with disabilities being transported on school bus lacked
special relationship).
56. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 70 F.3d 1364, 137374 (3d Cir. 1992) (school not liable under state created theory where it had not limited
plaintiffs freedom to act or barred her access to outside help).
57. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (city can be liable for
inadequate training of personnel only where such a lack was a custom and practice
that demonstrated deliberate indifference).
58. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Ed., 129 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing
federal district court's denial of summary judgment as to plaintiffs' § 1983 claim that
school had a constitutional duty to notify them that their son, who had emotional and
behavioral problems, had twice attempted suicide at school, rejecting plaintiffs' claim
that the school's failure to notify them had "affirmatively prevented" them from saving
their child's life. and asserting that compulsory school attendance laws alone are not a
"restraint of personal liberty" sufficient to give rise to an affirmative duty of
protection).
58. 70 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1995).
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education student who suffered from a seizure disorder and
Q.T. Syndrome, a heart condition, collapsed from heart failure
while being taken home on one of the buses owned by the
Board of Education. When the student collapsed, the bus driver
attempted to contact his supervisor on a C.B. channel but was
unable to do so because the equipment was faulty. However,
believing that that the student was having only a seizure the
school bus driver thought that medical attention was
unnecessary and continued to take the other children who were
on the bus to their homes. At one of the stops, a neighbor
approached with a portable phone, at which time the bus driver
contacted the bus garage and told the secretary to contact the
student's mother. By the time the bus reached the student's
home, the student was not breathing and he fell into a coma
and died three days later.
The mother brought claims under a constitutional tort
theory that the school board, its Transportation Coordinator,
and its Business Manager, all of whom allegedly knew of the
student's disabling condition had failed to maintain adequate
policies, rules, and regulations, and had failed to train its
employees in CPR and emergency procedures. In addition, the
mother asserted state law wrongful death and pain and
suffering claims against the Board on a theory of respondeat
superior based on the alleged negligence of its employees. 60
The district court, in an unpublished opinion, found that, as
a matter of law under § 1983, the defendants did not have a
constitutional duty to protect the student, that defendants did
not affirmatively place decedent at risk of harm, and that the
student's death did not result from a constitutional violation.
As to the state law claims, the district court found that Ohio
law immunized the school board from liability on the mother's
state law claims. The mother appealed the district court's order
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of
her claims to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Sixth Circuit in Sargi, in upholding the district court's
summary judgment, found that the mother had failed to
produce evidence of causation that the death of the student had

60. The Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the school district on the
state tort claims because state statutes did not impose a private cause of action where
a school bus lacked certain equipment nor did plaintiffs prove that the conduct of the
bus driver or the school district rose to the level of "wanton and reckless" conduct. Id.
at 913.
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resulted from a special relationship, the school board's custom
or practice of not adequately training its bus drivers, or a statecreated danger. Citing federal appeals court decisions
representing other jurisdictions, 61 the Sixth Circuit observed
that compulsory attendance would not, in itself, create a
special relationship requiring the school district to act in a
manner to protect a student with a disability. Even if the State
of Ohio had created a duty of care under state law to protect
students, the Sixth Circuit noted that "not all state created
duties of care create a constitutional duty of care and
protection." 62 As to the student's medical condition and the
school district's knowledge of that condition, the Sixth Circuit
found no special relationship between the [student] and the
school because "a special relationship can only arise when the
state restrains an individual. Decedent's medical condition and
its debilitating effects, however, were not restrictions imposed
or created by the state." 63
As to the mother's claim that the school board had adopted
and maintained a practice, policy, or custom of reckless
indifference to instances of children having seizures on school
buses, and that the policy had directly caused the
constitutional deprivation of the student's life, the Sixth Circuit
held that "there [was] no evidence that the Board affirmatively
adopted a custom, practice, or policy of taking children
suffering from seizures home without medical intervention." 64
Nor had the mother presented evidence that the school board
had adopted a custom, practice, or policy of preventing school
bus drivers from obtaining medical assistance for children
suffering from seizures or that the board's alleged failure to
train its employees rose to the level of deliberate indifference. 65
Deliberate indifference requires more "than a failure to
recognize [a] high risk of harm." 66
Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claims that
the school district had created the danger that resulted in the
student's death by:

See id. at 911, citing to cases from other federal circuits.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 912.
!d.
66. !d., citing to Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir.
1993).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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(1) failing to provide bus drivers with a plan or policy
concerning the management of emergencies on its buses; (2)
instituting a policy of taking seizure victims home without
any emergency medical intervention; (3) failing to maintain
properly working communications devices on the bus; and (4)
failing to communicate decedent's medical condition to her
school bus driver. 67

In essence, the court of appeals found "no evidence that the
Board [had taken] any affirmative action that exposed decedent
to any danger to which she was not already exposed."M;
Satisfying the federal courts' burden of proof requirements
is equally daunting for all student plaintiffs whether or not
they have disabilities. 69 A finding of negligence under state tort
law would not satisfy the section 1983 deliberate indifference
standard, but it is far from clear that even gross negligence
would meet that standard in the absence of establishing one or
more of the three causation factors discussed in Sargi. Just as
every constitutional violation does not constitute a common law
tort, not every injury inflicted by a government official in
violation of the common law rises to a constitutional violation 70
for the simple reason that "[o]rdinary tort law aims at the
private distribution of loss [while] [c]onstitutional tort law ...
involves the public distribution of rights and obligations." 71
Thus, although constitutional torts remain a popular theory for
litigation by students with, or without, disabilities, "the public
distribution of rights and obligations" does not become quite as
vital for students with disabilities where they also possess
significant statutory rights under the IDEA, § 504, and ADA. 72

67. Id.
68. Id. at 913.
69. See Parker v. Fayette County Pub. Schs., No. 08-5244, 2009 WL 1443706 (6th
Cir. 2009) (the Sixth Circuit followed its earlier Sargi decision and found no Liberty
Clause violation of a right to bodily integrity where an autistic student, who had run
away from school and was later found covered with mud and without his clothes. was
determined not to have suffered an injury compensable under section 1983 where
"there [was] no evidence of any trauma or injury, physical or otherwise.").
70. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
71. Gary S. Gildin, Allocating Damages Caused by Violation of the Charter: The
Relevance of American Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence, 24 NAT'L J. CONST. L.
121, 134 (2009).
72. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985).
With reference to § 504 and IDEA, the Supreme Court, in assigning only a rational
purpose test to mental impairment under the Equal Protection Clause, reasoned that
the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those
who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems,

2]

IDEA AND TORT THEORIES

377

III. PROTECTING BOTH STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND
REGULAR STUDENTS FROM HARM
A. Protecting Students with Disabilities

One of the effects of inclusion under the IDEA IS that
among special education students brought into regular
education settings are those whose disabilities cause them to
be more susceptible to injury. To what standard of care should
school personnel be held in protecting such students and what
should be the measure of liability where IDEA services are
provided in an inappropriate manner?
In Brooks v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 73 a
mentally impaired student, with an I.Q. of 56, a mental age of 6
years and a motor skill development of a child of 4 years, 2
months, 74 had been knocked down by two other junior high
students engaged in horseplay near a concession stand on
school property, resulting in 25% permanent disability to
plaintiff Brooks' left leg. The school had permitted its special
education students to eat lunch with regular students and to
walk on the school grounds when finished. On the day that the
student was injured, four teachers were on duty near the place
where the injury occurred. 75

but also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner
that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more
intrusive oversight by the judiciary ... The Federal Government has not only
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded
programs [§ 504] .. . [but] has conditioned federal education funds on a State's
assurance that retarded children will enjoy an education that, 'to the maximum
extent appropriate,' is integrated with that of nonmentally retarded children
[IDEA]").
For an example of a statutory protection under § 504 and ADA not available to
nondisabled students, see Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Con(., Inc., 94 F.3d
96 [111 Ed. Law Rep. [1154] (2d Cir. 1996) (although dismissing§ 504 as moot, Second
Circuit recognized that a nineteen-year-old Down Syndrome student who had a
provision for athletic participation in his IEP but who had reached his 19th birthday
prior to his senior year, and, thus was ineligible under state athletic association rules
to participate in interscholastic sports, had been entitled to the preliminary injunction
issued by a federal district court under § 504 and ADA permitting him to participate
on the swimming team, the district court reasoning that the association had
discriminated against the disabled student by not waiving the rule for him.).
73. 510 So.2d 51 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
74. Id. at 53, 54.
75. The ratio of teachers to students on the day of the injury is not stated, but the
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The basis for the parents' claim against the junior high
school under an ordinary negligence theory was that it should
have provided a one-on-one aide, even though the student's IEP
had not required one. The trial court found the school district
liable because an unreasonable risk of harm had been created
by permitting a student with poor balance to travel alone near
a concession stand where horseplay among regular education
students was common. 76
Reversing a $60,000 judgment for the student, a state
appeals court, in finding that the school had not been
negligent, identified two factors that were controlling in its
decision. First, the student's IEP had not required a one-on-one
aide, nor had the parents requested one in the IEP conferences.
Second, given the IDEA's emphasis on mainstreaming, the
student did not fit into a category of students who required
total segregation, that is, those who were "severely impaired
and who [had] limited or no motor skills and no language
ability." 77 In other words, the school district was not going to be
held to a standard of care to provide a service that the parents
had said was unnecessary.
However, the nature of the disability and the nature of the
school activity can alter liability. In Greider u. Shawnee
Mission Unified School/ 8 an IEP provided that a student with
a behavioral disability be enrolled in a woodworking class.
While in the class, the student was injured using a table saw.
The student's parents sued the school district, alleging among
other counts that the school had "place[d] him in the class
despite his behavioral disturbance" and had "fail[ed] to
properly notify [the woodworking teacher] of his enrollment in
the class and his particular needs." 79 The school district's
defense was that it was entitled to qualified immunity under
the state's Tort Claims Act 80 on the grounds that its
supervision of student safety and reasonable protection of
students was a discretionary function. In denying the district's
motion for summary judgment, the court not only held that
schools and teachers had a duty of supervision and instruction
ratio varied from 5:120 to 10:600. !d.
76. !d. at 51.
77. !d. at 54.
78. 710 F. Supp. 296 (D. Kan. 1989).
79. !d. at 297.
80. KAN. STAT. A."!N. § 75-6104.
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to students in general, but more specifically they owed a special
duty to students with disabilities. 1q The court observed that the
school had a duty under the IDEA to notify the teacher of the
student's needs and problems 82 and the teacher had a duty to
instruct the student in operating power tools, "despite his
behavioral disorder." 83
A similar result was reached in Guidry v. Rapides School
Board 84 where parents of a mentally impaired female student
sued a school district for negligence after their daughter had
been sexually assaulted by a mentally impaired male student.
The assault had occurred in a common area to which the
students had access after their morning break and which was
visually accessible from an adjoining teacher's lounge, except
for a small part hidden by a partition. The supervisory teacher,
who had gone to the teacher's lounge for a smoke break, upon
noticing the absence of two boys promptly returned to the
common area to find one of the boys kneeling over the girl.
Although the parents could not prove sexual intercourse, the
girl nonetheless had suffered considerable psychological harm.
In upholding a $16,000 damages award for the parents, the
court observed that "schools offering training for mentally,
emotionally, or socially handicapped young people have a duty
to use reasonable care to protect their students from harm." 85
Moreover, this reasonable care encompassed "the risk of
sexual behavior by students whose bodies have developed
beyond their mental ability to understand or control their
urges." 86 In Guidry, the teacher's knowledge that the students
required "constant supervision" determined the standard of
care and, thus, failure to provide that level of supervision
constituted a breach of duty. 87
School districts are obligated under the IDEA to provide
whatever services are necessary for a student to achieve a
meaningful educational benefit. What is the measure of
81. Greider. 710 F.Supp. at 299.
82. ::!4 C.F.R. § :100.328(d)(2). Each LEA must ensure that "Each teacher ... is
informed of- (i) His or her specific responsibilities, related to implementing the child's
IEP; and (ii) The specific accommodations, modifications, and supports that must be
provided for the child in accordance with the IEP."
83. Greider, 710 F. Supp. at 297.
84. 560 So.2d 125 [GO Ed. Law Rep. [262] (La. Ct. App. 1990).
85. Id. at 127.
86. Id. at 128.
87. !d.
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liability where a student InJury occurs from either
inappropriate design for services or ineffective implementation
of that design?
In Greening v. School District of Millard ,88 a state-licensed
physical therapist (PT) and occupational therapist (OT)
employed by the State of Nebraska Services for Crippled
Children designed a series of exercises for the plaintiff student
who had been born with a
congenital deformity
(myelodysplasia) that left him unable to ambulate, eventually
resulting in osteoporosis, and a weakening of the bones in his
legs. Neither the PT nor OT had time to work with the student
so the school district where the student attended elementary
school hired an aide to assist the student with the exercises.
During one session, when the student complained of a popping
sound, the aide failed to respond and continued the exercises.
Later that day, X-rays showed that the student had a leg
fracture. The state supreme court upheld lower court decisions
finding no liability for the school district because the district
could not be vicariously liable for an exercise program designed
by persons who were not their employees. 89 As to school
district's responsibility for its aide, who was not licensed as
either a PT or OT, in assisting the plaintiff to perform the
exercises the supreme court noted that,
[t]o impose liability on an employer for negligently entrusting
work to an employee incompetent to perform such work, a
plaintiff must not only show that the employer negligently
selected a person incapable of performing the work but also
show that the conduct of the incompetent employee was a
proximate cause of injury to another. 90

Since the physicians who testified at trial indicated that the
aide had neither incorrectly or incompetently supervised or
conducted the exercise regimen nor caused the student's injury,
negligence could not be predicated on the aide's lack of training
in PT. In the absence of evidence that the aide "knew the

88. 393 N.W.2d 51 [34 Ed. Law Rep. [1199] (Neb. 1986).
89. ld. at 59.
The district was entitled to rely upon the competence of a professional therapist,
licensed, paid, and supplied by the state. To hold otherwise would require a school
district to independently verify the safety of a program developed by a professional
who is entrusted by the state with the responsibility of carrying out such program.
Under the facts of this case, we decline to impose such duty on the school district.
90. Id. at 58.
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potential medical danger associated with the exercises," 91 the
supreme court refused to impute the aide's lack of knowledge to
the school district. However, the court cautioned that,
[A person may] be engaged in an activity, or stand in a
relation to others, which imposes upon him an obligation to
investigate and find out, so that the person becomes liable not
so much for being ignorant as for remaining ignorant; and
this obligation may require a person to know at least enough
to conduct an intelligent inquiry as to what he does not
know. 92

The school district escaped negligence vicarious liability
because the supreme court was not willing to "conclude that
the orders or directions given by any therapist to [the aide]
were so obviously improper, thereby requiring [the aide] to
disregard and refuse to carry out those directions, or, at least,
make further inquiry regarding correctness of any order or
direction given." 93
What is patently clear from Greening is that liability can be
premised on both the design and implementation of special
education services. The task of an IEP team is to design an IEP
for each student with disabilities who qualifies for special
education, identifying services that each student is to receive. 94
The expectation is that each IEP team will include personnel
familiar with the services specified in the IEP 95 and, in any
case, either the school district or parents can include "other
individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding
the child, including related services personnel as
appropriate." 96 What is clear from the IDEA and accompanying
litigation is that liability can be based on failure to have
knowledgeable personnel on the IEP team, as well as failure to
have appropriately trained persons implementing the IEP.

91. ld. at 59.
92. ld. quoting from PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, Negligence:
Standard of Conduct § 32 at 185 (5th ed. 1984).
93. ld.
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1436(d) for the list of requirements for an IEP.
95. For the minimum individuals required for an IEP team see 20 U.S.C. § 1414
(d)(l)(B)(i)-(vii).
96. 20 U.S. C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B)(vi).
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B. Protection of Persons from Injury by Students with
Disabilities
Students with disabilities, particularly those with
emotional disorders, can represent a risk of injury to other
students, as well as school personnel. To what standard should
school districts be held in protecting other persons in the school
from injury inflicted by special education students with
emotional disorder disabilities?
Where injuries have been occasioned by special education
students, some courts have made an effort to connect the
nature of the disability to the common law tort liability
standard of care. In Collins u. School Board of Broward
County, 97 a state appeals court upheld a jury verdict for a
student in a shop class who had been sexually assaulted by an
emotionally handicapped student. Since the assaultive student
was in the shop class by virtue of his IEP, the court found that
the duty of a teacher to supervise students is greater where
regular and emotionally handicapped students are included in
the same classroom. In response to the school district's claim
that it should not be liable for the intentional sexual
misconduct of a student, the court noted that the assault by
this student was foreseeable, given the student's past history of
sexually aggressive conduct, including exposing himself and
fondling other students. 98
Students with emotional and behavioral disabilities can
present risk of injury to employees as well as students. In
Brady u. Board of Education of City of New York, 99 a teacher
was injured when she intervened to prevent an assault by one
student of another. She sued the school district, on the theory
that the district knew of the assaultive student's violent
propensities and had failed to remove him from the school. A
state appeals court upheld summary judgment for the district
under governmental immunity, because a decision whether to
permit a student to stay in school was discretionary in nature.
As the court observed, "pupil placement is a matter of

97. 471 So.2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
98. Even though school officials had twice suspended the student for his
behaviors, this discipline, rather than demonstrating that the school had addressed the
behaviors, indicated that officials were aware of the behaviors and should, therefore, he
responsible for a higher level of supervision in the classroom. !d. at 564.
99. 602 N.Y.S.2d 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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educational policy, the responsibility for which lies within the
professional judgment and discretion of those charged with the
administration of the public schools." 100 However, the court
suggested that the district would lose its immunity if it owed a
special duty to teachers to protect them from assaults.
Although not specified by the court, this special duty could
probably be created by a variety of means-a state statute,
language in a collective bargaining agreement, or oral promises
from administrators. The court in Brady (in the absence of a
special duty) had not needed to address the issue of standard of
care. The IDEA requires that behavioral interventions be
included in a student's IEP where the child's misbehavior is
impeding learning, 101 but leaves open the question whether a
school district can be liable under a reasonable person standard
of care for failing to include appropriate measures to address a
special education student's misbehavior.
In Collins, discussed above, the assault by a student with a
past pattern of aggressive behavior had occurred during a tenminute span of time when a substitute teacher was absent from
the classroom. Although the case is silent regarding the
substitute teacher's knowledge about the assaultive student,
the court was clear that the presence of the emotionally
disabled student presented a different risk that had not been
addressed. Combining Greider and Collins, a school's duty to
inform classroom teachers about the problems and needs of
emotionally/behaviorally disabled students can affect the
standard of care.
However, a tort standard of care may not be relevant if a
state has created a different, higher standard. In
Vallandigham v. Clover Park School District, 102 a teacher and
paraprofessional, who had received, over the period of two
school years, 140-150 injuries (teacher) and 40-50 injuries
(paraprofessional) 103 from a 12-year-old autistic child with a

100. !d. at tl93.
101. For example, see :14 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2) where an IEP team must consider
"positive behavioral interventions, strategies, and supports" and include them in the
IEP if a child's misbehavior is impeding learning. For students with a disciplinary
change of placement or who have been removed for more than 10 days, a BIP must be
initiated with 10 school days, preceded by a functional behavioral assessment. For
students with a BIP, it must be reviewed by the IEP team within 10 school days of the
change in placement and modifications made as necessary.
102. 109 P.3d 805, 806 [197 Ed. Law Rep. [397] (Wash. 2005).
103. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 79 P.3d 18, 22 (Wash. Ct.
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behavior disorder, sought recovery for damages under the
Industrial Insurance Act's deliberate intention to mJury
exception to the exclusive provision of the Act. 104 Even though
the court found that the student's IEP reported repeated
aggressive episodes sufficient to create actual knowledge by the
school district that the student's conduct would produce injury,
the school district was not liable because it had not willfully
disregarded its knowledge of the certain injury. In upholding
summary judgment for the school district, a Washington court
of appeals held that the following responses by the school
district demonstrated that the district had not willfully
disregarded injuries imposed upon plaintiffs and other staff
members:
1. contacted [the student's] doctor about the change in
medication;

2. performed a functional behavior analysis to determine the
cause of [the student's] behavior;
3. continued documenting [the student's] behavior;
4. called an IEP meeting to discuss [the student];
5. assigned a temporary aide to work directly with [the
student];
6. hired a permanent one-on-one aide to work directly with
[the student];
7. created a separate area outside the classroom for use as an
isolation or time-out space;
8. offered restraint training and issued walkie-talkies to
selected staff;
9. sent staff to observe [the student] at the Frances Haddon
Morgan Center, where he had been placed for observation and

App. 2003) (seven other employees also received injuries during the two years ranging
from one to fifteen in number).
104. Wash. Rev. Code§ 51,24.020. This statute creates an exception to no employer
liability for job-related injuries where conduct causing an employee's injury satisfies
the standard of "deliberate intention:
If injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or her employer to
produce such injury, the worker or beneficiary of the worker shall have the
privilege to take under this title and also have cause of action against the
employer as if this title had not been enacted for any damages in excess of
compensation and benefits paid or payable under this title.
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10. placed [the student] in a half-day program;
11. staff from the Center visited the District to discuss [the
student] and his placement;
12. considered alternative placements for [the student], but
declined these alternatives because they were inappropriate
or unwilling to take [the student]. 105

A school's duty to protect can extend to members of the
public. In Thomas v. City Lights, 106 the plaintiff, a member of
the public, was assaulted at the National Zoological Park (the
zoo) at Washington D.C. by five students with behavioral
disorders. All five students were enrolled in City Lights, a
private, nonprofit school organized under District of Columbia
law for at-risk students, and were on a school field trip at the
zoo when the attack occurred. In denying the school's motion
for summary judgment, a District of Columbia federal district
court held that school owed a duty to supervise its students to
prevent foreseeable harm from occurring to members of the
public while on a field trip. The district court predicated
possible liability under § 316 of the second edition of the
Restatement of Torts that, "One who takes charge of a third
person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent
him from doing such harm." 107 Applying this provision, the
court reasoned that the school could be liable if it "(1) took
charge of the five students within the meaning of § 316, (2) if
the five students were likely to cause bodily harm to others if
not controlled, and (3) if City Lights knew or should have
known of the students' propensity to cause bodily harm." 108
Although Thomas discusses neither the IDEA nor IEPs,
City Lights was operated for "at risk children ages twelve to
twenty-two years of age." 109 To the extent that some or all of

lOfi. Vallandigham, 109 P.:3d at 24.
106. 124 F.Supp.2d 707 (D.D.C. 2000).
107. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 819 (1965).
108. Thomas, 124 F.Supp.2d at 712.
109. ld. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B).where the upper range of responsibility for
students under the IDEA is a student's 22d birthday.
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the students at City Lights had been placed there pursuant to
the IDEA, Thomas indicates that a school's duty under tort
liability can exist apart from its responsibility under the IDEA.
The troublesome aspect of Thomas, to distinguish it from other
cases involving injuries to employees or other students, is that
members of the public are unlikely to have any knowledge of
the risks posed by the behaviors of some students with
disabilities and, thus, the Restatement of Torts' effort to shift
responsibility to those in the school who have such knowledge,
arguably, seems appropriate.
School districts have the responsibilities both to implement
the IDEA and to protect students, school employees, and
members of the public. In terms of school employees and
students, one approach might be applying a reasonable person
test to school officials' responses to complaints about disabled
students' conduct. The reasonableness could be twofold:
reasonableness in reconvening an IEP team to address such
complaints; and reasonableness in providing services to
address the objectionable conduct, which could include using
the due process hearing route to require services, even if not
desired by parents.
IEPs, arguably, are effective only so far as school personnel
who work with emotionally/behaviorally disabled students are
aware of their provisions. To the extent that an IEP should be
important (if not determinative) in defining standard of care,
how should a school district's responsibility to communicate
information to school personnel affect that standard of care?
The IDEA follows the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA) 110 in providing access to "education records"
without parental consent to those persons with "legitimate
educational interests," 111 a right of access that normally would
include all school personnel working with a student with a
behavioral disability. However, the FERPA does not permit
providing information about a person's disability to members of
the public.
Determining the appropriate standard of care for
emotionally/behaviorally disabled students is difficult because
there is not an easy fit with other areas of tort liability. The
perception by regular education students, parents of such

110. 20 U.S.C. § 1232f; 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3-99.67.
111. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(l).
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students, and teachers that emotionally/behaviorally disabled
students are dangerous may result in demands to remove these
students from the classrooms. 112 In cases involving students in
general, if a student/parent/teacher complaint involved
dangerous power equipment, the standard of care would be
commensurate with the risk represented, including heightened
requirements for instruction and supervision, or possibly,
making the equipment inaccessible to students. 113 Would the
same characterization work for emotionally/behaviorally
disabled students? Would treating such students as if they
were a dangerous power saw fly in the face of the IDEA's
purpose to dignify special education students by "ensur[ing]
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes related services
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
employment and independent living"? 114 Courts face a
challenge in addressing an appropriate tort liability standard
for students with disabilities (and especially those with
emotional/behavioral disabilities) in that a standard of care, if
it is to honor the requirements of the IDEA, must be
established that does not demean, degrade, and prejudge these
special education students by placing them in the same
categories as dangerous objects, activities, or places. 115

112. See e.g., Ross v. Maumee City Schs., 658 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) where a violent student's removal from a multi-handicapped unit followed a
meeting with parents of other students in the unit and a threatened lawsuit by parents
of an injured child.
11 :~. See e.g., Fontenot v. State Dep't of Educ., 635 So.2d 627 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(special education student who severely lacerated his hand while adjusting the guide
fence on a power saw when the blade was turning lost in negligence suit where
instructor had been in classroom during injury, where student had not been required to
have individual supervision, and where the instructor's instructions about adjusting
tlw blade had been adequate).
114. :14 C.F.R. § :100.l(a).
115. The inherent danger argument is prevalent in products liability where it is
used to present a claim for strict liability without the need to produce evidence of
negligence or willful conduct. See e.g., Fallon u. Indian Trail Sch., 500 N.E.2d 101 [35
Ed. Law Rep. [1205] (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (rejecting claim that trampoline was
intrinsically dangerous so as to create strict liability for injuries that occurred while
using it and rejecting claim of negligent hiring as to whether PE teacher was qualified,
the appeals court observing that liability for negligent hiring arises only when
particular unfitness of applicant creates danger of harm to third person which
employer knew, or should have known, when he hired and placed applicant in
employment where he could injure others).
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The contractual nature of an IEP creates difficulties in
defining the standard of care for school districts that may face
litigation under a tort liability claim for injury to, or at the
hands of, special education students. 116 Should districts be
limited in their standard of care to what they have committed
to do under an IEP? Clearly, a district's responsibility for the
safety of regular education students is defined, at the least, by
the ordinary standard of care under negligence, and possibly a
heightened standard for the higher risk level of dangerous
objects, activities, or places. Regular education students,
however, do not negotiate IEPs under the IDEA with school
districts.
The choice as to how to resolve liability issues resulting
from the interaction of the IDEA and tort liability is not an
easy one. Although school officials may want to remove an
aggressive student from a regular educational setting, they are
constrained by the LRE requirements of the IDEA. To subject
those officials to the risk of tort liability, after they have
selected a less restrictive environment and another student is
injured, would arguably serve to undercut the purpose of the
IDEA's LRE requirement. One approach would be that the
standard of care for school districts should be measured solely
by the timeliness and appropriateness of their actions under
the IDEA in reconvening an IEP team, assessing a student's
IEP, and designing behavioral modifications. Increasing the
standard for tort liability for placement decisions would likely
result in increased use of due process hearings by school
districts in the hope that administrative or court decisions
upholding placement decisions would block tort claims where,
at the heart of an injured party's claim, is a question regarding
the reasonableness of a placement decision that brought a
student with behavioral disabilities in contact with other
students.
Special education students are unique in that they have
services and review processes available to them that regular
education students do not. To limit school district liability for
116. See Graham v.
Law Rep. [1012] (N.Y.
entitled to unseal the
instances of violent and

West Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 460 [136 Ed.
App. Div. 1999) (student assaulted by another student was
assaulting student's disciplinary file to discover any past
assaultive behavior).
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the injury to, or an injury caused by, special education students
resulting from compliance with an IEP creates, one could
argue, the appearance of two different standards for measuring
student safety. In essence, school districts could be shielded
from tort liability as long as they comply with the IDEA, while
no such shield would exist for claims that do not involve
students with disabilities. Perhaps, the best that can be said is
that, because of the public policy significance of addressing the
needs of special education students under the current
affirmative obligation statute (IDEA), our society may have to
live with a certain measure of legal inconsistency.
The lack of clarity as to how the requirements of the IDEA
affect tort liability under state or constitutional tort theories
should prompt school officials to take several preemptive steps.
First, school districts need to communicate to all public
education personnel who work with special education students
that the provision of services in a student's IEP can be the
basis for liability claims, not only for reimbursement and
compensatory damages under the IDEA, 117 but also for
damages under a state or constitutional tort liability theory.
Second, school districts need to check their district liability
policies to assure that their personnel who work with students
with disabilities are covered for student-related injuries, even
those involving gross negligence or willful conduct. Third,
employees need to be advised that they should consider
personal insurance protection, such as that provided by
professional organizations, where they may be individually
liable for injuries related to students with disabilities. Fourth,
although not addressed in law cases discussed in this article,
school officials may want to consider whether volunteers and
chaperones who often accompany students on school trips
should receive some measure of instruction concerning
students with special needs. Very little litigation involves
questions regarding the adequacy of supervision of volunteers
or chaperones, 118 but the best interest of students in general
117. See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484 (2009) (upholding
reimbursement of tuition cost for unilateral parent placement where school district had
failed to provide FAPE). See also, Mary T. v. School District of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d
2:35, (3d Cir. 2009) (relying on Ji'orest Grove to find no claim for reimbursement or
compensatory damages as a result of parent private school placement).
118. See Robinson v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 9 So.3d 1035 (La. Ct. App. 2009)
(in a case not involving a special education student, the court found no negligence
where student's death on a field trip was not caused by school district's lack of a policy
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(and special education students in particular) would seem
served by providing those volunteers and chaperones with
sufficient information to protect the students on field trips from
foreseeable risks. 119

on training chaperones).
119. See generally, Jeffrey L. Brudney, The Effective Use of Volunteers: Best
Practices for the Public Sector, 62-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1999) (discussing
at some length the extensive use that public schools make of volunteers in tutoring,
working in school programs, and in field trips).

